But today, we particularly see the example of many far-right wing parties embracing Israel. This leads to the provocative question of whether far-right wing parties are authoritarian organizations: particularly the current Republican party. Nevertheless, however distasteful they may find liberal segments of the Jewish community, and there's ample evidence that they do, the worldwide far right has found a large and powerful segment of the Jewish community to whom they've leant their full support - perhaps because they see similar goals in the Israeli right, a movement that has a stranglehold on the Israeli government these parties covet to implement in their own countries.
Now, the people who tack left among you, I would institute a note of caution. If you think that these right wing parties are actually antisemitic and show their real colors when dealing liberal Jews, please remember, those who tack right think that leftists show their real antisemitic colors when dealing with Israel.
The next quote is very simple, but I want you to take a few minutes to ponder the particular question it poses.
'The Jews very clearly were the only inter-European element in a nationalized Europe. It seemed only logical that their enemies had to organize along the same principle.'
As we said before, when one side organizes transnationally, it follows that their most strenuous opponents have to organize trans-nationally as well.
So my question is this:
Is it inevitable that populations basically coalesce around only two solutions?
-----------------------------------------------------
Which Side is the Dreyfusards?
So now we have to talk about L'affaire Dreyfus, the Dreyfus affair. I didn't write down many Arendt quotes about it because it was thick with social history and cultural references I'd have to explain, but Arendt believes that the Dreyfus affair was the true proto-formation of totalitarianism: a mass irrationality between 1894 and 1906 that coalesced around an organization that forever found new reasons to justify the fictional belief that French army officer Alfred Dreyfus was guilty of espionage for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Years after Dreyfus was exonerated, years after a conspiracy by the French General Staff to frame Dreyfus was uncovered, millions still believed Dreyfus was guilty. Why? Because he was a Jew, and Jews are always guilty. When the anti- Dreyfusards demonstrated they often marched through Marais, Paris's historic Jewish neighborhood, shouting 'La Mort aux Juifs': 'Death to the Jews'! Occasionally they rioted and looted what they took to be Jewish businesses. It's often noted that from the younger anti-Dreyfusards came the ranks of the officials who ran Vichy (fascist) France.
This is another Arendt assertion that was controversial in its day, but it can't be denied, many of the elements of totalitarianism are here in embryo: the show trials for which citizens convince themselves to believe the fiction against all evidence, the singling out of a convenient scapegoat that activates people's innate prejudices, and the mass demonstrations to perpetuate the fiction. Many anti-Dreyfusards believed that to be pro-Dreyfus was to be anti-France itself. It was much easier for them to believe a Jew capable of espionage than to believe the French army was capable of a coverup.
For twelve years, the Dreyfus affair was all France talked about, it was all Jews talked about, in fact it was what all of Europe talked about. The trials and conspiracies gripped France like no trial has ever gripped the United States. In order to understand the weight of the Dreyfus affair, you would have to imagine a trial that so gripped a nation that friends and family who fell on either side of the verdict would have difficulty speaking to each other. Even marriages were said to break up over it.
From the vantage of a century and a quarter, there is something about L'affaire Dreyfus that seems a little trivial. As the trial of one man went on, Belgium slaughtered millions of Congolese, Britain expanded its empire to a quarter of the globe, and all the European powers prepared for what was soon to be the most horrific conflict up to then in world history. But there has always been something about trials that elicits the passion of millions that more consequential events rarely do. As Stalin said, and I'm sure this quote will come up again, 'The death of one man is a tragedy, but the death of a million is a statistic.'
The Dreyfus affair literally split France down the middle. Marcel Proust, now regarded as early 20th century France's pre-eminent writer, wrote some choice recollections of how people would go to any length to justify their belief that Dreyfus was guilty. They would persist in their belief in spite of all appeals to logic, telling themselves that people believed in Dreyfus's innocence because it was 'fashionable.' Others objected to the strident tone of his letters from prison, believing no innocent man could be so angry. If people did change their opinion, it was not because of any logic but because of the heart. One character changes his view of Dreyfus because other people in high society believed Dreyfus innocent, and surely people of such high social standing can't be wrong.
This goes to show a truth more obvious than we ever want to admit. Politics is not a matter of the head, it is a matter of the heart and nerves. Most of us don't have empirical evidence for what we believe. We put our trust in people who seem to know more than us whom we assume tell us the truth in good faith. We either believe them or disbelieve, and more often than not, our beliefs are conditioned by our socialization. Political views are often predicated on the acceptance of friends, or a family member's love, or advancement at work, and if people who matter so much in our lives believe something, we often come to believe it too. Or we come to believe the opposite as a means to spite them.
So now we come to the present day: insofar as people know about the Dreyfus affair and care, I would think both sides of American partisanship would like to imagine themselves the Dreyfusards. One side definitively right, one side definitively wrong. Both sides can't be right.
I would ask you which side is right and which side is wrong, but that's much too simplistic a question.
I think the way to do this is to pose these issues as a series of nuanced questions, and as we're close to wrapping up a unit on antisemitism, a number of these questions will be framed through Jewish issues:
1. There are certain issues on which the evidence for one side is so overwhelming: issues like climate change, the viability of vaccines, the manner Republicans take away voting rights, that you would have to believe in conspiracies and mass irrationality as big as the Dreyfus Affair to deny their truth. Are those people who accept the obvious truth within their rights to decide debate or doubt of these facts is not acceptable in polite company? Is it acceptable to speak ill of and to those who insist on speaking skepticism?
2. There are certain issues where the terms of the debate are so different from side to side that the arguments of either side are unrecognizable to each other. When speaking of gun legislation, one side usually speaks of gun deaths, the other side usually speaks of gun rights. How do you facilitate a dialogue between two sides that have priorities so completely different from each other that the argument of one side has nothing to do with the argument of the other side?
3. Some issues have three sides. On issues of the economy, one side believes government has little-to-no right to interfere, one side believes government should interfere however much will provide the best economy, and a third side believes government has a moral responsibility to its citizens to run the economy in such a way that everyone gets some income. Of course, all three sides believe that the best results will come from their policies particularly. How do you frame a debate between all three sides? Two sides have exactly opposite beliefs, the other has almost completely different concerns. How do you frame a dialogue in which each side makes sense to the others? Is it possible?
4. Regardless of any moral question on either side of the debate, evidence shows pretty well that society is better off, richer, safer, when abortion is available. And yet there are men of bad faith who only care to support abortion because it enables their sexual freedom, and if a sexual partner gets pregnant, they pressure the woman to have one. While there are many strongly anti-abortion people, even activists: nurses, nuns, and others, who minister to those who've had abortions with no qualms, even provide emotional support for those who get one. Should someone doing the right thing for the wrong reason be fully censured? Should someone doing the wrong thing for the right reason be fully praised? If not, how do you praise and/or censure them?
5. There are certain issues on which unbridgeable divides prevent solidarity between peoples. For example: when the 2017 Women's March organized, they numbered among their chief organizers an activist named Linda Sarsour, a Palestinian who like most Palestinians supports a one-state solution, but more notably has made incendiary statements online like that it is not possible to be both Zionist and feminist. Far more incendiary, Sarsour and two other chief organizers worked in the past in close association with Louis Farrakhan. Farrakhan is the head of the Nation of Islam, a group with some following but the African-American community has groups with far greater followings that it would be of greater benefit to work closely with. Next to the Million Man March, Farrakhan's greatest claim to fame is blaming Jews for everything from the slave trade to sharecropping to Jim Crow. He has repeatedly called Jews "Satanic." Many organizations involved with the Women's March advocated for the abolition of the State of Israel, which is not an issue much involved with the experience of most American women. Obviously, this made it difficult at best for many liberal Jews to march in solidarity. The questions are these:
5a: Should guilt by association prevent people from marching together in common cause?
5b: If you believe the issues at stake are too important, what are the conditions by which would you put your differences aside?
5c: Picture some of the issues you care about most. What level of disaster would have to happen to make the issue important enough that you'd put all concerns aside about dubious allies?
6. There are issues on which the traditional Republican party line may, and I emphasize 'may', be quite a bit more right than most Democrats. Twenty to twenty-five years ago, when the Bush administration issued warnings about the seriousness of terrorism, many Democrats refused to take measures from the new Department of Homeland Security seriously, refused to believe this Republican administration could warn about terror in good faith, believed that many of the notions in the Patriot Act were an unforgivable suspension of civil liberties, and could point to the Iraq War as proof that every Republican notion about fighting terror was disingenuous. While twenty years later, when the COVID outbreak hit, many Republicans refused to take measures from the Center for Disease Control seriously. refused to believe that unelected public officials could warn about the spread of disease in good faith, believed that many of the CDC measures were an unforgivable suspension of civil liberties, and could point to the low priority of solving the opioid crisis as evidence that every Democratic notion about saving lives was disingenuous.
My questions are these:
6a. Even if one side of an argument is definitively right and another is definitively wrong, when is it wiser to simply obey the decisions you disagree with without fuss? By doing so, you know that you'll have a greater moral right later to demand the other side accord you the same respect.
6b. What kind of mistake or malfeasance would so ruin the credibility of people you always disagree with that you would actively work to sabotage them?
6c. Picture yourself as a member of Congress or some European parliament: What happens when there are issues on which you could not disagree more with your own side and agree more with the other side? Would you work with the other side against your own? You know that by crossing that aisle, you would lend your opponents your credibility and prestige, you would make them seem less partisan as they work for goals you hate, and make it harder to enact legislation you want the peers in your party to pass.
Sometimes, there is an issue where one side is the Dreyfusards, and one side is the anti-Dreyfusards, but on most issues, people struggle to come up with the right answer, and whether they're right or wrong, whether they decide in good faith or bad faith, you must believe that those who disagree come to their conclusions in good faith as well if you ever want them to do the same. If that's, in fact, what you want.